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WHAT JUDGE BORK SHOULD HAVE SAID
Cass R. Sunstein*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE recent resignation of Justice William Brennan from the
United States Supreme Court is merely the most dramatic symbol
of a now-familiar truth: The Warren Court is dead. Its death is of
course in large part a result of political victories by conservative presidents, victories that have produced a Supreme Court whose members
self-consciously reject the methods of its recent predecessors. But the
death of the Warren Court also represents a victory of ideas. The aggressive role of the Supreme Court in bringing about social reform-a
role without precedent in the history of the adjudicative branch of government-has been criticized as a usurpation of democratic authority;
as a departure from the original understanding, the cornerstone of judicial legitimacy; and most fundamentally, as hardly law at all. This con* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School and Department of Political Science. This is the text of a speech delivered at the University of Connecticut Law School on September 26, 1990 as part of the Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar
Program. I am grateful to the students and faculty there for their extraordinary kindness and
hospitality on that occasion. The reader is asked to make allowances for the informality that
characterizes an essay originally written for the lecture format. Some of the ideas found in the
second half of this essay also appear in Sunstein, Constitutional Polities and the Conservative
Court, I THE AMERiCAN PROSPECT 51 (1990).
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stellation of ideas has played an important role in transforming the performance and self-conception of the federal judiciary.
In this essay I have two.purposes. The first is to respond to a standard criticism of the sort of judicial role that was represented by the
Warren Court. This form of criticism is stated most straightforwardly
in Judge Robert Bork's bestseller, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law.' Despite the Senate's rejection of President Reagan's nomination of Judge Bork for the Supreme Court, views
similar to those of Judge Bork have increasing influence within the federal judiciary and perhaps the nation as well. In particular, there seems
to be mounting agreement with Judge Bork's particular understanding
of the distinction between the neutral, apolitical invocation of the original understanding on the one hand and the subjective, value-laden use
of the judge's own preferences on the other. For Judge Bork, departure
from the original understanding amounts to abandonment of the Constitution and political judging, that is, the illegitimate substitution of
judicial values for democratic ones.
I want to suggest here that this position is barely an argument at
all, serving instead as a misleading, albeit popular, rallying cry. Its
principal defect lies in its failure to acknowledge the need for interpretive principles for use in construing any legal (or other) text. Because it
relies on some such principles without defending or even recognizing
them,2 it provides no basis for its own approach.
My second purpose is to suggest that even for those sympathetic to
many of the Warren Court's decisions, there are good reasons to be
ambivalent about social reform through the judiciary. Judges are likely
to be ineffectual in promoting social reform; their methods and procedures are best suited to compensatory justice. Reliance on the court
system may divert resources from other, better channels for reform.
Moreover, judicial involvement may well undermine the very causes
that it purports to help. For example, the withdrawal of the Court from
areas of discrimination on the basis of disability and race, and from
abortion as well, appears to be fueling democratic engagement on those
questions in ways that will have more substantial and healthy long1.

R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989).

2. Judge Bork does of course recognize that his interpretive principle is the original understanding. What he does not recognize is: (a) that the decision to make that understanding decisive
is itself an interpretive principle, one that must be defended rather than identified with the Constitution; and (b) that any characterization of the original understanding requires other, supplemental interpretive principles.
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term implications for social reform than anything that could be expected from.'a Warren Court successor. These sorts of pragmatic, consequentialist considerations, I suggest, provide a legitimate basis for
concerns about an aggressive role for the Supreme Court in promoting
social reform. These concerns should in turn play a role in developing
interpretive principles with which to give meaning to the Constitution.
In any case, it is those concerns, rather than the backward-looking
arguments made by Judge Bork and others, that should be foremost in
the minds of those interested in the appropriate role of the Supreme
Court in the constitutional order. The rhetoric of "political seduction of
the law" is a misleading and unhelpful diversion.
II.

A.

JUDGE-MADE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The Legacy of the Warren Court

Now that the era of the Warren Court is over, it is worthwhile to
pause briefly to examine its legacy. It is surprising but true that many
of the principles of constitutional liberty most prized by Americans
were created, not by the founders, but by the Supreme Court during
this cefitury. At the very least, the particular understandings of those
principles-understandings that have given those principles their current life and content-are recent creations. Indeed, for most of the
country's history the liberties for which our Bill of Rights is so widely
celebrated and revered, here and abroad, were sharply circumscribed.
The overriding reason for their expansion has been the interpretive
practices of the modern Supreme Court.3
If contemporary Americans looked at the charter of constitutional
freedom in America as it existed in 1940, or if they could imagine an
emerging democracy (say, in Eastern Europe) committing itself to that
charter, they would see a system falling far short of their ideals. It is
because of the Warren Court that constitutional liberty includes the
right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, including
segregation; to broad protection of political speech, subject to a sharply
limited "clear and present danger" exception; to political participation,
including equality in voting; to hearing rights for those receiving government benefits, including employment, licenses, and social security;
to freedom from sex discrimination; and to broad protection of religious
conscience. Even those who reject-as almost everyone does--some as3. To say this is not at all to say that they have reached their appropriate place. See Infra Part
in.
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pects of the Warren Court's legacy will probably treat the bulk of its
work as an indispensable part of our constitutional heritage.
Speaking realistically, a return to a narrowly described "original
understanding" would result in the elimination, in one bold stroke, of
central parts of existing constitutional safeguards, producing constitutional protections that would be judged-both by Americans and by
those who seek to emulate our practices-as extremely thin indeed. All
this does not count by itself as a sufficient argument in favor of the role
set by the Warren Court. But it is, perhaps, a useful prelude for understanding current disputes.
B.

The Argument of The Tempting of America

The Tempting of America sets out a distinctive approach to constitutional interpretation. In its broad outlines, the argument is quite
straightforward. Some judges are "neutral"; 4 they follow the law.
Other judges are political; they participate in "a major heresy,"5 that
is, they deny "that judges are bound by law." 8 The line between the
two depends on whether a judge "is bound by the only thing that can
be called law, the principles of the text, whether Constitution or statute, as generally understood at the enactment."17 No one who disagrees
with this view "should be nominated or confirmed." 8
According to Judge Bork, judges who reject this view "not only
share the legislative power of Congress and the state legislatures, in
violation both of the separation of powers and of federalism, but assume a legislative power that is actually superior to that of any legislature."9 The heresy is particularly indulged by "people [who] see the
Constitution as a weapon in a class struggle about social and political
values," 10 are "egalitarian and socially permissive,"', "hold only contempt for the limits of respectable politics, ' u 2 or invoke "a kind of restless and unprogrammatic radicalism
that does not share but attacks
traditional values and assumptions."1 " The "philosophy of original un4.
5.

R. BORK, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 4.

6. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10. The 1960s appear to loom large in The Tempting of America, which makes
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derstanding" has the large contrasting value of "political neutrality in
judging." 15
One might expect that the "fall"'u from neutrality to politics
would be a recent phenomenon, but in fact Judge Bork describes it as
something that immediately followed the ratification of the Constitution. Not merely Justice Brennan, and not merely the "liberals" on the
Warren Court, but also-to mention simply a few-Chief Justice Marshall and Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Harlan
were seduced by the temptation to substitute politics for law. They too
were tempted to abandon the Constitution.
Judge Bork's position is thus uncomplicated. It begins with the
proposition that the Constitution is law and that those who ignore the
Constitution are acting lawlessly. It adds to this uncontroversial claim
a thesis about interpretation, that is, an identification of "the Constitution" with the understanding about its meaning held by those who ratified it. On this view, a judge who rejects the original understanding of
meaning rejects the Constitution itself, or is, in effect, in a free-fall in
which meaning is supplied by his own predilections or value judgments.
For such a judge, the Constitution becomes irrelevant. Only his own
views count. It is here that neutrality, and hence legitimacy, is wanting
on the judge's part. For Judge Bork, avoidance of value judgments is a
crucial part of the task of law, and reliance on the original understanding alone serves that function.
Substantive outcomes follow from this conclusion. There is no
right of privacy. Indeed, liberty receives no substantive protection
under the fourteenth amendment. Rational basis review would apply to
all forms of discrimination other than those based on race and ethnicity. 7 The consequence is that discrimination on the basis of gender, or
on almost any other basis, is extremely likely to be upheld (though
Judge Bork is not entirely forthcoming here).28 Poll taxes are permissible, 19 as are violations of the principle of one person-one vote.2 0 Besome of the rhetoric appear out-of-date.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. And it is described in very much these terms. Religious imagery-anguage of heresy, fall.

and so forth-runs throughout The Tempting of America and of course is recalled by its title as
well. There may be a connection between the repeated notion of heresy and the failure to offer
substantive arguments against the heretical position.
17. Id. at 330.

18.

Id.

19.
20.

Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 84-87.
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cause the equal protection clause applies only to the states, the federal
government can discriminate on the basis of race or indeed on any
other ground. If it chose, it could segregate on the basis of race or
exclude blacks from federal employment. 21 Compulsory sterilization of
some criminals would be acceptable.2 2 Many federal programs of the
New Deal period and after would be unconstitutional.23 Congress
would have more limited authority under section five of the fourteenth
amendment than it now does, and would be barred from invalidating
state literacy requirements.24 Affirmative action would be banned.20
Perhaps most dramatically, the Bill of Rights probably would not
apply to the states, though here Judge Bork is unaccountably cautious. 26 Of course, flag desecration could be criminalized; 27 creches
could be displayed in public buildings; 28 states could exempt profits
from the sale of Bibles and religious literature from taxation. 2 One
need not disagree with all of these conclusions in order to recognize
that Judge Bork's Constitution would be dramatically different from
the document as it is now understood.
C. Arguments for Adherence to Original Understanding
It might be tempting, or even correct, to think that the meaning of
the Constitution is settled by the original understanding held by its ratifiers. But surely an argument is necessary before one should accept
that position, especially, perhaps, in view of its repudiation by so many
leading members of the Court,3 0 and of the extent to which that position would undermine principles of constitutional liberty that have and
21. Id. at 83. Judge Bork does argue that states cannot segregate and that Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was therefore correct. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 81-83. But his
discussion of the point seems rather tortuous, and many readers will emerge from the discussion
with the firm impression that on Bork's own method, neutrally applied, Brown was wrongly decided. See Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990).
22. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 66.
23. Id. at 56-57.
24. Id. at 91-93.
25. Id. at 107-10.
26. Id. at 93-95.
27. Id. at 127-28.
28. Id. at 128.
29. Id.
30. Many members of the Court, of course, have accepted the original understanding but
characterized it differently from Judge Bork-as including, for example, principles whose shape
changes over time. This category includes all justices who have treated the free speech clause in
roughly this way-that is, all modem justices. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
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deserve widespread support.
Those who believe that the original understanding is not decisive
do not, of course, reject the Constitution.31 They do not believe that the
Constitution is not binding. They do not reject the actual Constitution.
Instead they suggest that the proper interpretation of the Constitution
requires resort to other considerations. Often they claim that this conception of interpretation is itself historically required. In any case they
propose, not to abandon the Constitution, but instead to understand its
meaning by reference to something other than the original understanding conceived as Judge Bork does.
What argument does Judge Bork offer on behalf of his view? In
only one place does he squarely address the question:
It has been argued ...

that the claim of proponents of

original understanding to political neutrality is a pretense
since the choice of that philosophy is itself a political decision.
It certainly is, but the political content of that choice is not
made by the judge; it was made long ago by those who
designed and enacted the Constitution. 3
It is worthwhile to pause over this passage. In brief: The original
understanding is binding because the original understanding was that
the original understanding is binding. The historical claim is itself
highly uncertain. 33 The text of the Constitution invites the view that its
meaning is capable of change over time, and there is evidence that the
framers did not believe that their original understanding would control
the future. 34 But I want to put that point to one side. Judge Bork's
claim is that the binding character of the original understanding is settled by the original understanding. This is not an argument at all; it is
circular, or an axiom, or a rallying cry. To those who believe that it is
necessary to defend the view that the original understanding is binding,
it will be less than unpersuasive.
31. See Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence(Book Review), 57 U. Cia. L REv. 657 (1990).
32. R. Boa.K, supra note 1, at 176-77.
33. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMocRACY A DLSRUST 22-41 (1980) (discussing privileges and immunities clause, equal protection clause, and ninth amendment); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L Rnv. 5 (1949) (discussing intended delegation to the courts); Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HAnv. L Rnv.
885 (1985) (discussing framers' own failure to rely on original intent).
34. See generally sources cited supra note 33. It is most surprising that Bork says so little
about the actual history. In fact, his historical references consist almost exclusively or sources that
can be found in introductory casebooks. See Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99
YALE LJ. 1419 (1990).
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I have searched The Tempting of America for a more substantial
justification for the book's central proposition. There appear to be several different strategies, whose relationship to one another is obscure,
and whose role in defense of the original understanding is never clearly
articulated.
On several occasions Judge Bork argues by shifting the burden of
argumentation:
Why should the Court, a committee of nine lawyers, be
the sole agent for overriding democratic outcomes? The man
who prefers results to processes has no reason to say that the
Court is more legitimate than any other institution capable of
wielding power. If the Court will not agree with him, why not
argue his case to some other group, say the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, a body with rather3 5better means for enforcing its decisions? No answer exists.
Judge Bork seems to be arguing here that a decision deserves respect if
it can be connected to a judgment by "the people"; it does not if it
cannot.
But this is a crude approach to the question of legitimacy. Obedience to the Court is not justified simply because its decisions are compelled by a judgment made in some sense by the people-especially
when the relevant people died long ago. Ultimately obedience is justified, if it is, for some amalgam of substantive reasons: The Constitution
is a good one; it has a fair degree of democratic pedigree, both in its
original adoption and in the possibility of amendment; the consequence
of a decision to abandon the Constitution would be intolerable chaos.
By itself, the fact that there was agreement on some document by some
people many generations ago is insufficient for "legitimacy." A decision
by the Supreme Court does not warrant obedience for that reason
alone.
So too, Supreme Court decisions do not lose their rightful claim of
allegiance merely because they are not connected to a particular decision of the Constitution's ratifiers. To say that only Supreme Court
decisions that are justifiable by reference to the original understanding
warrant allegiance is to mistake a conclusion for an argument. On this
score, Judge Bork's claims about legitimacy mirror his (circular) response to the contention that it is necessary to defend adherence to the
35.

R. BORK, supra note 1, at 265.
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original understanding in political terms. In fact, a judicial decision deserves allegiance, if it does, for a complex mixture of reasons, roughly
analogous to those that support a decision to be bound by the Constitution itself. Those reasons involve the need for stability, the justness of
the system as a whole, the possibility of democratic corrections, and (to
some limited extent) the substance of the decision itself. A tight connection with a previous decision of the polity is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for legitimacy.
Judge Bork also suggests that adherence to the original understanding is justified because abandonment of that understanding will
lead judges to make "moral choices" that they have not been authorized to make, and that cannot in any case be made in the face of moral
disagreement among the populace. A key point, for Judge Bork, is that
"revisionist" theorists require a judge "to make a major moral decision." 6 Legitimate judges, by contrast, are simply agents of the people.
Because people cannot "all agree to a single moral system," 37 judges
cannot properly invoke morality at all, on which the citizenry is hopelessly divided: "Why is sexual gratification more worthy than moral
gratification? Why is the gratification of low-cost electricity or higher
income more worthy than the pleasure of clean air?" 38
There is, however, no way to avoid "moral decisions," even major
and controversial ones. The view that the original understanding is
binding requires a moral or political theory, and thus acceptance of
that view rests on a (disputable and disputed) moral foundation. The
very fact that Judge Bork's theory of interpretation is controversial
among the citizenry attests to the fact that it rests on such a foundation. In this respect his approach, like any other, relies on moral decisions that require substantive defense. Reliance on the original understanding does not avoid recourse to a moral system at all.
No text, constitutional or otherwise, has meaning apart from the
precepts held by those who interpret it, and those precepts cannot be
found in the text itself." The selection of precepts must itself be justified in moral and political terms. To say this is not at all to say that
language imposes no constraints or that meaning lies solely with the
interpreter. But it is to say that meaning is a function of culture, and
36. Id. at 252.
37. Id. at 253.
38.

Id. at 258-59.

39. See Dworkin, supra note 31; for a detailed discussion in the context of statutory construction, see C. SuNsmIN. AFTER THE RiGHTS REVOLUTIoN ch. 3 (1990).
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that aspects of culture are subject to evaluation.
In addition, it is impossible to decide how to characterize the original understanding without adverting to moral considerations. History
itself will not do the job. To reiterate some familiar points: It is necessary to decide whether the clause embodied a general concept capable
of change over time or instead the particular understandings held by
those who ratified it. It is also necessary to translate the original understanding into conditions that the ratifiers could not have anticipated.
To carry out both these tasks, interpreters must invoke something other
than the historical record. No final answers can be found there.40
The claim of lack of authorization is merely another version of the
claim of illegitimacy, and it is no more productive here than there. It is
true that there is disagreement about morals and politics among the
citizenry, but the fact of disagreement does not mean that the conflicting positions are not subject to mediation, as they in fact have been in
multiple areas, including those of race and sex discrimination. The fact
that a decision has moral dimensions does not imply that it is not subject to reason. As we have seen, Judge Bork's own view rests at bottom
on moral and political choices, having broadly to do with the perceived
value of (his conception of) democratic self-determination and fear of
judicial willfulness. But The Tempting of America does not acknowledge that these are moral and political choices, and so spends almost no
time in defending them.41
Judge Bork sometimes defends his position by general references
to democratic self-determination, and here he is on firm ground. Any
plausible theory of constitutional interpretation must pay a great deal
of attention to the democratic aspirations of the American constitutional tradition. But the principle of democracy is too vague, standing
by itself, to justify any particular conception of the judicial role. For
example, that principle might call for an exceptionally aggressive judicial role in protecting rights of political participation and in safeguard40. Thus, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), cannot be resolved
by reference to the original understanding; it is necessary to translate the requirement of equal
protection into the conditions of the 1950s, in which public education had attained a quite novel
status. So too, the original understanding that the equal protection clause does riot forbid sex
discrimination need not resolve the question in light of the generality of the framers' language, the
difficulty of determining whether they understood by that language a general concept or their
particular conceptions, and the extreme difficulty of sorting out that question without resorting to
extratextual and extrahistorical considerations.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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ing the interests of groups likely to be disfavored in politics. 4 2 Without
much more, the principle of democracy does not require adherence to
the original understanding.
It is, I think, no accident that the position set out in The Tempting
of America is not so much defended as proclaimed. If the position were
actually to be defended, its central claims would take on entirely new
dimensions. The rhetoric of heresy and seduction would have to be
abandoned; the line between neutrality and moral judgments would be
unsettled; the defense would have itself to partake of moral and political judgments. An argument for originalism, or (what is not the same
thing) for a modest judicial role, will have to speak of political theory,
and not only of the framers. To make that argument would be to abandon the moral high ground on which The Tempting of America tries to
stand.
I want to conclude this section with a summary that slightly generalizes the point. Every text requires interpreters to draw on background norms or principles that they themselves must supply. To say
that a text has a plain meaning, or that there is no room for interpretive doubt, is often to say something true; but when it is true, it is
because there is no disagreement about the appropriate background
principles. Those who deny the existence of such principles are in fact
without self-consciousness. They believe that their own views are so
self-evident that they do not amount to interpretive principles at all but
instead are "part" of the text. Interpretive principles are, however, always operative. That is no embarrassment to constitutional law, or indeed to law itself, but instead an inevitable part of the exercise of reason in human affairs.
The question is not whether interpretive principles exist, but
whether they can be defended in substantive, value-laden terms. Many
imaginable Supreme Court decisions would not be susceptible to such a
defense, and surely some of Judge Bork's particular conclusions are
sound. But because he never defends his own interpretive principles,
asserting instead that those who do not share them would abandon "the
Constitution," he offers no reason for anyone to agree with him.
I conclude that originalism is merely the latest version of formalism in the law. It represents the pretense that one can decide hard
cases in law by reference to value judgments made by someone else.
Those who indulge in that pretense usually end up not by abandoning
42.

See J. ELY, supra note 33, at 24-41.
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value judgments but by making them covertly. The real fault of Judge
Bork's version of originalism is that it attempts to mask its own
foundations.43
I have not dealt in detail with the particular positions on constitutional questions set out by Judge Bork, but it is revealing that those
positions generally line up, not with some original understanding, but
with the conservative wing of the Republican party: no affirmative action, fewer restrictions on governmental power to aid religion, no abortion rights, greater constraints on national power, greater constraints
on pornography, fewer intrusions on presidential power, and greater
protection of property rights.""
D. Legal Authoritarianism
The Tempting of America is the most prominent recent illustration of what might be called "legal authoritarianism," a term that I use
in a special sense. I mean the term to refer to all approaches to law
that ultimately trace legal legitimacy exclusively to an exercise of
power, or to the view that might makes right, or to some prior settlement among those with political power. On this view, legal legitimacy
need not, and indeed must not, be justified by reference to substantive
claims about the right or the good. Thus understood, the category of
authoritarianism is a broad one, encompassing highly democratic approaches as well as others that are far less palatable. Authoritarianism
in law has no necessary alliance with liberalism or conservatism. Indeed, democratic authoritarianism finds prominent expression in
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Hugo Black, both of whom emphasized, as a centerpiece of their approaches to law, the need for
judges to ratify prior agreements among those with political power. 45
For Black in particular, interpretive principles seemed unnecessary and
indeed hubristic, since they introduced a measure of discretion and
nonneutrality into law. 46 For Black, the constitutional text was usually
self-interpreting. 47
If legal authoritarianism is understood in these terms, its antonym
43. Cf. the very different approach in Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849 (1989) (acknowledging criticisms of originalism and attempting to defend it on substantive and institutional grounds).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 17-29; see also R. BORK, supra note 1, at 205.

45. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Rogat, The Judge
as Spectator, 31 U. CmI. L. REV. 213 (1964).

46.
47.

See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70-71.
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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is not democracy. For this reason, the term will be misleading to those
who identify authoritarianism with an absence of legitimate electoral
processes. But I hope that it is not unfair to contrast authoritarianism,
as understood here, with all approaches that demand of law, and of
government through law, some justification that goes beyond the exercise of political power. Such approaches also span a wide range. The
antonym of authoritarianism is not allied with any political program.
Because such approaches require governmental action to be justified by
something other than the will of the majority, and because they emphasize the need for interpretive principles, which often must be justified in
substantive terms, they frequently appear, from the authoritarian perspective, to be irremediably antidemocratic.
Legal authoritarianism has a number of characteristic features. It
sees laws as deals among self-interested actors. It is commonly skeptical of normative argument altogether, or of efforts to reason about social and economic problems. It commonly disparages such efforts as a
mere mask for self-interest, or as incapable of mediating social and
political disputes, which it treats as based on premises too fixed and
incommensurable to be a subject of deliberation. Mediation is possible
only by warfare or compromise among self-interested bargainers. Disagreements about ethical and political problems are, for the legal authoritarian, not an occasion for shared reasoning but instead proof of
its impossibility. Value judgments, understood as prejudices, are seen
as the consequence. Authoritarianism thus tends to have a positivist
understanding of law and legal authority. The source of law is an exercise of sovereign power, constituted as such by other people with sovereign power, in a chain ultimately connected to some foundational exercise of power. The disjunction between law and politics is understood in
these terms.,
There is a distinctive authoritarian style in constitutional law as
well. Authoritarianism provides the foundation for one conception of
judicial restraint. Because ordinary legislative outcomes reflect the play
of social forces, they should not be disturbed unless the interference is
itself the result of some other, superior decision by such forces. Authoritarianism is also drawn to firm linguistic anchors-"the text"-and for
two reasons. First, the text is the best evidence of how the social forces
in the community have resolved themselves. Second, departures from
the text leave interpreters in the world of unfettered value judgments,
or prejudices. Moreover, the authoritarian position tends to see social
outcomes expressed in authoritative texts as embodying the will of
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some collective "us"--even if the text were written many years ago and
even if important segments of the community were excluded from the
decision.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the authoritarian position
treats most of its claims as axioms, in need of no real defense. The very
call for a defense is often said to mark people as heretics or as demanding their exclusion from the relevant community. When defended in
substantive terms, the authoritarian claim takes on altogether new
dimensions and ceases to be authoritarian at all. And for the next generation of legal studies, perhaps the most crucial task is the development of modes of analysis that resist the authoritarian temptation and
do not purport to be purely deductive, but that nonetheless recognize
and exemplify the possibility of mediating social disputes through good
reasons rather than poor ones.
III. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES?

I want now to shift gears. Judge Bork's nomination was of course
defeated, but his ideas are shared, perhaps increasingly, by influential

members of the legal community, and the position of the current Court
has many commonalities with that of Judge Bork. We might obtain a
useful angle on the problem by exploring the sort of constitutional
agenda that would be set by a modern-day successor to the Warren
Court. If the Supreme Court, for our time, brought to bear on current
practices the kind of critical eye that the Warren Court brought to the
1950s and 1960s, what kinds of changes might be expected? I do not
mean to endorse all of these proposed results, some of which strike me
as inadvisable or even preposterous; I do mean to obtain a sense of
what has been lost or gained by the abandonment of an aggressive role
for the Supreme Court in the area of social reform. One of the unfortunate consequences of the constitutional attack on the Warren Court is
that it has preoccupied its participants so much as to distract them
from the task of imagining the ingredients of a different constitutional
order, mandated judicially or not. The following is an admittedly hypothetical agenda.
(1) The area of sex discrimination is probably the place to start.
Under current law, principles of "formal equality" bar attack on a
number of candidates for serious constitutional review. Consider the
problem of reproductive freedom, which is now treated as a matter of
"privacy," even though issues of sexual equality loom at the surface of
the debate. Legal control of women's reproductive capacities has been
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central to sex discrimination, and the effort to forbid abortion is closely
connected (simply as a matter of actual legislative motivation) with
fears about women's rejection of their traditional role. A Warren Court
successor might well have seen public and private behavior that bears
on pregnancy-in the workplace and in the criminal law-as raising
serious problems of sexual equality.
There are many other examples. It is widely reported that the
criminal justice system deals inadequately with domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape, and abuses in the production of pornography.
Often it is alleged that the inadequate treatment is a reflection of discrimination. It would not be at all difficult to imagine a constitutional
attack, rooted in principles of equality, against police practices that fail
to redress domestic violence. Such attacks might be based on a prominent part of the original understanding of equal "protection" of the
laws, which was designed to ensure equality in the administration of
the criminal justice system.
Another example is provided by the current rules of family law,
which ensure that after divorce, the welfare of most men will increase
dramatically and the welfare of most women will decrease correspondingly.4' The current rules do not reward women but indeed punish
them for their contributions to childcare and housework. Because most
women receive custody of children but low support payments upon divorce, a constitutional attack would be quite plausible here.
Additional illustrations are provided by the presence, in the United
States, of a social security system that benefits people the more closely
they come to traditional male career paths, and that keeps weakest and
0
most defenseless those who have assumed traditional female roles;'
and of workplaces that continue to be structured on the basis of male
norms and expectations, captured in, for example, the exclusion of fertile women from certain jobs and halfhearted childcare policies in general. 50 All of these problems could be seen as raising issues of sex
discrimination.
(2) As currently interpreted, the Constitution has little or nothing
to offer the handicapped. Discrimination against the mentally retarded
48. In California, for example, a man's standard of living increases by 42% after divorce,
while a woman's falls by 73%. See L WmztAN. THE DIVORcE RBvoLmtno 338 (1985).
49. See Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone.
Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 CoLUM L REv. 264 (1989).
50. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990); Becker, From
Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cm. L REv. 1219 (1986).
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is subject to rational basis review. 5' Moreover, disabled people face numerous obstacles in a world made by and for the able-bodied; many of
these obstacles are embodied in law. An attack on seemingly neutral
standards, based on able-bodied norms that effectively exclude disabled
people, could well be marshalled under principles of constitutional
equality.
(3) The sexual privacy of homosexuals is unprotected. 2 Probably
the best guess is that the current Court would find discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, including wholesale exclusions from governmental employment, to raise no serious constitutional question. A
different Court would have taken this issue much more seriously.
(4) People who are homeless, poor, starving, or victims of domestic
violence have no right to relief in the Constitution, which is said to be
exclusively a charter of negative liberties.5" Another Court would have
made at least some inroads on the positive-negative distinction, furnishing a degree of protection here. At a minimum, the Court might have
said that selective exclusions from funding programs have to be persuasively justified. Such a Court would have been closely attuned to the
ways in which selective funding can pressure the exercise of constitutional rights.
(5) Under current interpretations, the Constitution has no bearing
on efforts to control environmental degradation. In the 1960s and
1970s, environmental groups argued that the founding document imposes on government some obligation to protect the citizenry against
the environmental damage brought about by industrial development.
Although such arguments attempted to draw on common law ideas
about the integrity of property and person, they were unsuccessful in
the courts. Of course there would be considerable difficulties in marking out a judicial role in this setting. But -one might have expected
some success from a different set of judges and justices.
(6) In the area of race discrimination, seemingly neutral practices
that have the effect of excluding blacks from important arenas of public life are subject to little scrutiny. Tests, educational qualifications,
electoral systems, and other requirements are permitted so long as they
are minimally rational.54 Another Court would have subjected these
51. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
52. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no
right to protection against domestic violence).
54. The key case here is of course Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also Rogers
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rules-in such areas as education, employment, and welfare-to a requirement of justification or to a showing that alternatives without discriminatory consequences would be less effective.
Taken as a whole, an agenda of this sort would provide an impressive set of proposals for constitutional reform; this is so even if, as
seems likely, some of the proposals should not be accepted by a court.
Such an agenda would confront the contemporary Constitution with
the same sorts of pressures, dilemmas, and opportunities that were furnished to the Warren Court in the period beginning in the 1950s. If the
agenda seems overly ambitious, perhaps we might remember how much
more ambitious were the changes that the Court actually brought
about in the period between 1950 and 1980--changes that would indeed have seemed inconceivable to observers in, say, 1940.
IV. AGAINST SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH COURTS

Would it be desirable for the Court to embark upon courses of this
sort? Should the Supreme Court engage in social reform in such areas?
If what I have said thus far is correct, the Court's unwillingness to
involve itself in these issues cannot be justified by reference to "legitimacy," at least not without substantial additional arguments. A judicial role in some or many of these areas would fall within the boundaries of the text. Moreover, invocation of the Constitution in many of
these settings could be connected to the general understandings for
which the document stands; for at least most of them, there would be
no greater strain here than in cases creating (for example) a wholesale
prohibition on racial discrimination and a right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender.
I want to argue that judicial involvement in most of these areas
would indeed have been unjustified, and that in any case the shift from
constitutional adjudication to constitutional politics has a great deal to
be said in its favor. I want, in short, to outline some of the considerations that Judge Bork avoided in his argument for a constrained judicial role. These arguments do not sound in neutrality; they are selfconsciously value-laden. But they suggest that an aggressive role for
the Supreme Court in social reform carries with it significant disadvantages, and that a judicial withdrawal promises significant benefits as
well. The relevant considerations fall into three overlapping categories:
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (voting). A greater burden is, however, imposed under federal
statutes. See, e.g., 42 .U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (employment).
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efficacy, democracy and citizenship, and the narrowing focus of
adjudication.
A. Difficulties in Court-Led Reform
1. Efficacy
The first point is that judicial decisions are of limited efficacy in
bringing about. social change. Study after study has documented this
basic conclusion.55 Brown v. Board of Education56 itself is usually
taken as a counterexample, but it is in fact the most conspicuous confirmation of the point. 57 Ten years after the decision, no more than about
two percent of black children in the South attended desegregated
schools.58 It was not until 1964, after the involvement of Congress and
the executive branch, that widespread desegregation actually occurred.
The Court is far more effective in vetoing a decision than in attempting
to bring about social change on its own.59
The decision in Roe v. Wade6° may be another illustration, though
the picture here is mixed. It is undoubtedly true that the decision increased women's access to safe abortions, 61 and to some extent increased the legitimacy of the practice of abortion. Surprisingly, however, it did not dramatically increase the actual rate of abortions. 62 It is
thus inaccurate to say that there have been significantly more fetal
deaths as a result of the Supreme Court's decision. Perhaps more fundamentally, the decision may well have created the "moral majority,"
helped defeat the Equal Rights Amendment, prevented the eventual
achievement of consensual solutions to the abortion problem, and severely undermined the women's movement both by spurring and organizing opposition and by demobilizing potential adherents.
Some evidence for all of these propositions has been provided rela55. See D. HOROWITZ. THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); R.S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); G. ROSENBERG. THE HOLLOW
HOPE (forthcoming 1991).
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. See G. ROSENBERG, supra note 55.
58. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474
(1986).
59. Of course it is possible that the legislative and executive actions would not have occurred
without the spur of Brown, but even this is uncertain. See G. ROSENBERG, supra note 55, at 107156.
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. G. ROSENBERG. supra note 55, at 175-201; see also H. RODMAN. B. SARVIS & J. BONAR.
THE ABORTION QUESTION (1987).
62. H. RODMAN, B. SARVIS & J. BONER, supra note 61, at 23.
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tively recently, with the extraordinary public reaction to the Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services's decision." The Court's partial retreat
from Roe may well have galvanized the women's movement in a way
that will have more favorable and fundamental long-term consequences
for sexual equality than anything that could have come from the Supreme Court. To say this is not to say that Roe was necessarily wrongly
decided, either as a matter of constitutional interpretation or as a matter of principle. But it is to say that its effectiveness has been limited,
largely because of its judicial source.
More generally, it is not clear that in terms of civil rights and civil
liberties, the United States has developed significantly differently from
other liberal democracies 'that lack judicial review (most notably
France, England and, until recently, Canada) or those that have such
review but have quite different constitutions (most notably West Germany). Of course judicial review has, in some settings, accomplished
considerable good and even introduced important changes into American society. But the post-Warren Court focus on the rulings of the Supreme Court has often been myopic. The fate of civil rights and civil
liberties in a democracy depends more fundamentally on a range of
cultural, social, and economic factors than on the nine justices.
2.

Democracy, Citizenship, Compromise, Legitimacy

In two ways, reliance on the courts may operate as an alternative
to democratic channels. It might divert energy and resources from
politics, and the eventual judicial decision may foreclose a political outcome. On both counts, the substitution has large costs. The resort to
politics can produce a kind of citizen mobilization that is a public and
private good, inculcating political commitments, broader understanding, feelings of citizenship, and dedication to the community. An emphasis on the judiciary that compromises these values will carry with it
large attendant disadvantages. In this connection it is important to recall that Martin Luther King was quite possibly a far more important
source of constitutional change than any or even all of the Warren
Court's decisions concerning race.6 5
63. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
64. Thus many of the 1988 elections featured abortion as a central issue, and considerable
pressure was imposed by the pro-choice movement.
65. The common view that the Court's decisions helped to mobilize political actors and protest, or to pave the way for King, appears to have strikingly little empirical support. See G. ROSENBERG, supra note 55, at 107-156.
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In any case, political channels are often a far better channel for
sensible and effective reform. Individual preferences, and their intensities, can more easily be reflected in mutually advantageous accommodations.6" And if questions of morality tend to become questions of constitutional law, their resolution before nine judges can be harmful to
the practice of citizenship. As noted, some of this effect is already visible in the context of the abortion controversy. 7 The same may also be
true in the context of race discrimination, though the evidence is mixed
here. 8
The Court, in short, is not the only "forum of principle" in American government.6 9 On the contrary, the major reflections of principled
deliberation in the history of American government have come from
Congress and the President, not from the judiciary. In the last generation it has become commonplace to contrast a principled, deliberative
judiciary with a reflexive, interest-ridden political process." ° But this
position amounts not merely to a counsel of despair. It disregards the
phenomenon, frequently observed in practice, of deliberative politics, in
which existing conventions are subject to critical scrutiny. The belief in
deliberative politics through institutions other than courts has, of
course, been central to American constitutionalism since its inception. 1
To say all this is not to deny that judicial review can make up for
systemic inequalities in majoritarian processes or introduce principles
that come to such processes only with difficulty. But it is to say that an
aggressive Court is, on traditional liberal grounds, the furthest thing
from an unambiguous good, and this is so even if the Court's goals are
sound.
66. Two qualifications are necessary here. First, I do not mean to suggest that preferenceaggregation is an appropriate model for politics. Second, systemic disabilities in the political process--collective action problems and other disparities in political influence--make it hazardous to
identify a deferential judicial role with democratic self-government.
67. See G. ROSENBERG, supra note 55, at 175-201.
68. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 passed the Senate on July 18, 1990. S. 2104, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1990). It passed the House on August 3, 1990, with one amendment. H.R. 4000, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). President Bush vetoed the Act on October 22, 1990, and the Senate
sustained the President's veto on October 24, 1990. 48 CONG. Q. 3672 (Oct. 27, 1990).
69. See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), which defends an aggressive judicial
role by reference to the need to insert principle into political processes, a defense that seems

plausible but perhaps historically myopic and insufficiently ambitious with respect to politics itself.
70.

See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); R. DWORKIN, supra note 69; M.

PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).

71.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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3. The Narrowing Focus of Adjudication
Adjudication is an exceptionally poor system for achieving largescale social reform. Courts are rarely expert in the area at hand, and
the focus on the litigated case makes it hard for judges to understand
the complex systemic effects of legal intervention. A decision to require
expenditures on school busing might, for example, divert resources
from an area with an equal or greater claim to the public fisc. Creation
of a legal right against pollution may have a variety of harmful and
unintended effects on the public and private sectors, including unemployment and higher prices--effects that are difficult, especially for
courts, to anticipate. Ideas of this sort provide some support for the
Court's aversion to the recognition of positive rights.
Moreover, legal thinking and legal procedures are most comfortable with ideas, growing out of the tradition of compensatory justice,
72
that are poorly adapted to the achievement of serious social reform.
In the compensatory model, if A injures B, B must restore the status
quo ante by making payment. But this model is ill-suited to many issues of social reform that might be treated as a matter of law. Consider, for example, problems of pollution, in which numerous people are
harmed to a small degree. Here the purpose of legal controls is not to
ensure compensation, but to manage and reduce risks. The inevitability
of complex trade-offs, involving impositions on numerous other people,
usually makes a rights-based approach highly unrealistic.7 3 So too, the
problem of discrimination is usually not the commission of tort-like
acts of discrimination by identifiable actors at identifiable times to
identifiable victims. It is instead the existence of structures or systems
of subordination that should be reformed. Constitutional adjudication is
ill-adapted to undertaking the necessary changes.
4.
Summary: The Difficulties of Social Reform Through the
Judiciary
These criticisms of the judiciary are hardly novel. Though voiced
principally by conservatives in the last decades, analogous complaints
played a major role in the New Deal period, in which it would have
seemed extremely peculiar to suggest that social reform on behalf of
72. See generally Sunstein, The Limits of Compensatory Justice, COmPENSATORy JUSnc:
NOMOS (forthcoming 1991).
73. See Reaume, Individuals. Groups, and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U. TORONTo L. 1
(1988).
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the disadvantaged should come from the courts. 4 Indeed, the rise of
modern regulatory agencies was largely a product of a belief that the
judiciary lacked the will, the means, and the democratic pedigree to
bring about social reform on its own. The period that we are entering
will see a similar constellation of ideas.
These considerations bear on the development of interpretive principles with which to give meaning to ambiguous constitutional provisions. They suggest that courts ought to be cautious in giving broad
meaning to open-ended phrases, at least if such a meaning would require courts to undertake large-scale social reform on their own. Together with the obvious fact that interpretive principles should attempt
to reduce judicial discretion, they indicate that a constitutional democracy ought not to place heavy reliance on the judiciary for such tasks.
If all this is correct, there are significant advantages to the current
institutional shift. It is important to recall here that of the three most
dramatic periods of aggressive social reform in the twentieth century,
two occurred during the progressive period and the New Dbeal.71 Here
the Supreme Court was mostly hostile to the relevant changes, but it
was unable to stop them, and its very hostility may have fueled them.70
And in the third period-the environmental, consumer, and antidiscrimination movements of the 1960s and 1970s-by far the most important changes, of both degree and kind, were driven principally by
Congress. The courts played a subsidiary role.
B.

Other Institutional and Democratic Possibilities

If social reform in the various areas discussed thus far is to happen
outside of the courts, on what institutions might reliance be placed?
There are many possibilities. States and localities have shown, in the
last decade, an impressive degree of initiative and imagination, going
well beyond the Supreme Court and the Congress in many areas-by,
for example, enacting aggressive measures forbidding discrimination on
the basis of disability, sex, and sexual orientation. At the national level,
the principal civil rights gains have occurred through legislative action
in the context of discrimination on the basis of sex, disability, age, and
race. It is important to recognize that the Supreme Court is not the
only institution in government charged with fidelity to the Constitution.
74.

See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123-55 (1938).

75. See C. SuNsTmIN, AFTER THE RIoHs REVOLUTION Ch. 1 (1990).
76. See, e.g., Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
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If the Court, for institutional or other reasons, interprets the Constitution narrowly, this responsibility becomes all the more insistent.
The principal constitutional sources of national legislative power
here are the commerce clause-granting Congress the authority to regulate all actions having a significant effect on interstate commerce-and, perhaps most notably, the great underused provision of
the Constitution, section five of the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment has, of course, been the source of the overwhelming
majority of the important Supreme Court decisions in the area of civil
rights and civil liberties, including the application of the Bill of Rights
to the states, Roe v. Wade,7 and all discrimination cases. It is too infrequently remarked that the last sentence of this amendment says that
"[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." Despite this injunction, Congress has
taken up the invitation exceptionally rarely. Indeed, the judicial rather
than legislative enforcement of the fourteenth amendment may qualify
as the most profound irony in the history of American
constitutionalism.
But the Supreme Court has itself concluded that Congress's power
under section five is extraordinarily broad.7 8 Indeed, the Court has permitted Congress to invoke section five to proscribe practices that the
Court has itself upheld. In allowing Congress to invalidate literacy tests
that the Court had permitted, the Court explicitly said that Congress
could, under section five, strike down practices that the Court would
allow.7 9
This conclusion turns out to be no puzzle if it is recognized that
the Court's decisions are a product not only of substantive theory but
also of institutional constraint. Precisely because of its lack of democratic pedigree, the Court is sometimes unwilling to enforce the Constitution as vigorously as it would if it were not so constrained. Congress
faces no such constraints.8" However ironic it might seem, there would
be little reason for surprise if the Court found that Congress acted well
within its constitutional authority in using its powers precisely in order
to overrule the most restrictive recent decisions of the Court itself.
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Ironically, Katzenbach is a principal target
of The Tempting of America. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 91-93.
79. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648-49, 658.
80. Cf. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARv. L. Rav. 1212 (1978) (discussing judicial underenforcement of the Constitution for institutional reasons).
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CONCLUSION

The Constitution does not contain the instructions for its own interpretation. Those who see the original understanding as decisive
should not claim that people who disagree are abandoning the Constitution. Instead they bring to bear on the document a different set of
interpretive principles. A commitment to the original understanding reflects a commitment to a particular set of interpretive principles, and
those principles, like its competitors, must be justified in substantive
terms.
Because The Tempting of America does not defend its own interpretive principles, instead treating them as self-evident, it provides no
reason for anyone to accept them. In this sense, it is one version of
legal authoritarianism: the view that legal outcomes are legitimate if
and because they are traceable to a prior exercise of power. Because it
does not acknowledge its own dependence on interpretive principles,
this approach to constitutional interpretation is not an argument at all.
These considerations do not, however, provide a reason for rejecting the original understanding or for accepting an aggressive judicial role in social reform."1 The limited efficacy of the courts, the consequences of such a role for self-government and citizenship, and the
adjudicatory form all suggest that such a role is at best a mixed blessing. Concerns of this sort do not by themselves point in the direction of
a particular set of interpretive principles. But they do suggest that an
aggressive judicial role should not be seen as representing the natural
or best form of constitutional democracy in America. A withdrawal of
the federal judiciary from social reform in the name of the Constitution
might ultimately amount to an important, albeit partial, step in reviving democratic forms; and it might aid in spurring passive or weak
groups toward greater participation in resolving the important questions of the day. Such a step would constitute a movement-ironic,
modest, ambiguous, and tentative, to be sure-in aligning constitutional practices in America with the far more conspicuous developments in self-government now occurring throughout the globe.

81.

R. DWORKIN, supra note 69, powerfully challenges believers in the original understanding

on the ground that they assert rather than defend their interpretive practices; but it perhaps fails
sufficiently to explain why a constitutional democracy should be committed to an aggressive judicial role, aside from reasonable but conjectural remarks about comparative competence.
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